I argue that much of the confusion surrounding Aristotle's discussion of these two questions is a consequence of an inadequate understanding of the first-order doctrine. When they are viewed against the backdrop of these higher-priority issues much of the difficulty disappears. This means disentangling the second-order elements from the first-order ones and showing how the first-order doctrine informs and illuminates Aristotle's peculiar discussion of these two important second-order questions. I shall take up the question of "polity" first, then the question of the "best constitution absolutely."
II. Difficulties in Aristotle's Presentation of "Polity"
There are four related difficulties in Aristotle's various discussions of polity (in the narrow sense of a species of constitution) in the Politics. One of these is that he seems to define it differently in different places. Of course politeia is his generic term for "constitution" in general; in this sense all constitutions of whatever type are politeiai. But as a specific form it seems to be different things. At times (III. vii 1279 a37-39) it is "rule by the many (to plethos) with a view to the common advantage." At other times (IV. viii 1293 b33-34, 1294 a23-34) it is called "a mixture of oligarchy and democracy"; still elsewhere (IV. xi 1295 a36ff.) it appears to be identified with "the middle constitution" (he mese politeia). These are not isolated or unique definitions. The first, which is also associated with rule by those who possess the military virtue (or again, with those bearing heavy arms), recurs at IV. xiii passim; cf. II. viii 1268 a23, II. ix 1270 a2-6, and VI. iii 1289 b30. The second recurs throughout much of Books IV-VI; sometimes (e.g., IV. viii 1294 a23-24) it is called a mixture of rich (euporoi) and poor (aporoi), or of the wealthy (plousios) and the free (eleutheroi). The third definition is prominent in IV. xi passim and has been detected by some commentators in IV. xii-xiii (e.g., 1296 b35-37). A second difficulty is closely related to this one: Aristotle appears to equivocate concerning the manner in which political offices are distributed in polity, that is, the principle of distributive justice in this form. Sometimes (e.g., III. xvii 1288 a15-17) he holds that polity should recognize "merit" in assigning offices; at other times (e.g., IV. viii 1293 b32ff.) he claims that only wealth and freedom should be regarded. Some commentators have detected an even more deepseated ambivalence in Aristotle's discussion: sometimes he seems to favor enlarged popular powers for this form of state, at others he
